We develop a novel optimization model to maximize the pro t of a Demand-Side Platform (DSP) while ensuring that the budget utilization preferences of the DSP's advertiser clients are adequately met. Our model is highly exible and can be applied in a RealTime Bidding environment (RTB) with arbitrary auction types, e.g., both rst and second price auctions. Our proposed formulation leads to a non-convex optimization problem due to the joint optimization over both impression allocation and bid price decisions. Using Fenchel duality theory, we construct a dual problem that is convex and can be solved e ciently to obtain feasible bidding prices and allocation variables that can be deployed in a RTB se ing. With a few minimal additional assumptions on the properties of the auctions, we demonstrate theoretically that our computationally e cient procedure based on convex optimization principles is guaranteed to deliver a globally optimal solution. We conduct experiments using data from a real DSP to validate our theoretical ndings and to demonstrate that our method successfully trades o between DSP pro tability and budget utilization in a simulated online environment.
INTRODUCTION
In targeted online advertising, the main goal is to gure out the best opportunities by showing an advertisement to an online user, who is most likely to take a desired action, such as ordering a product or signing up for an account. Advertisers usually use the service of companies called demand-side platforms (DSP) to achieve this goal.
In a DSP, each individual advertiser sets up a list of campaigns that can be thought of as plans for delivering advertisements. For each campaign, the advertiser speci es the characteristics of the audience segments that it would like to target (e.g., males, ages 18-35, who view news articles on espn.com) along with the particular media that it would like to display to the target audience (e.g., a video ad for beer). In this work we will call an impression type to a speci c collection of those a ributes (e.g., male, California, interested in sports). In addition, the advertiser speci es a budget amount, time schedule, pacing details, and performance goals for each campaign. e performance goals typically can be speci ed by minimizing cost-per-click (CPC) or cost-per-action (CPA).
e DSP manages its active campaigns for many di erent advertisers simultaneously across multiple ad exchanges where ad impressions can be acquired through a real-time bidding (RTB) process. In the RTB process, the DSP interacts with several ad exchanges where bids are placed for potential impressions on behalf of those advertisers. is interaction happens in real time when an ad request is submi ed to an ad exchange (which may happen, for example, when a user views a news story on a webpage). In this scenario, the DSP needs to o er a solution to decide, among the list of all campaigns associated with its advertiser clients, which campaign to bid on behalf of and the bid values.
e advertisers who work with the DSP expect its budget to be spent fully or at least in an adequate amount as their marketing areas count on it. Failure to do so may motivate an advertiser to stop working with the DSP in the future, which is unacceptable for its business. In addition, they would like their budget to be spend smoothly if possible.
en, the DSP faces the problem of maximizing its pro t while ensuring an adequate budget spending for its advertisers clients.
DSPs can charge their clients using several pricing schemes, for example in a CPM format advertisers are charged a xed amount per thousand of impressions showed to users (which is mostly used for branding of products). If the advertisers are interested in some click or action of interest, they may pay in CPM scheme, but requiring that no more than certain amount per click or action of interest is paid (action of interest could be lling a form, purchasing a product, etc.). In this work, we we will assume that the DSP gets paid only when a click or action of interest occurs, but has to pay to the ad exchanges for each impression it acquires. is is a challenging payment se ing as the DSP may have a negative operation if the actions or clicks of interest don't occur at the rates the DSP expects. It is important to mention that DSPs usually receive millions of ad requests opportunities per minute, and their bidding systems needs to respond to each of this ad request in ma er of milliseconds making most companies apply simple heuristics to bid in the RTB systems. To simplify notation we will assume in this work that the advertisers are interested in clicks of interest, while this work apply in general to any action of interest.
As a nal remark ad exchanges may use di erent auctions types to sell advertisement opportunities. As an example, several ad exchanges such as OpenX, AppNexus have announced that they use rst price auctions, i.e. the highest bidder pays the ad exchange the amount it o ered, while others like Google's AdX have announced that they use second price auctions which is that the highest bidder pays the second highest bid submi ed to the ad exchange. is add an extra layer to any general DSP optimization algorithm that may want to bid in di erent ad exchanges for the same advertisers.
In this paper, we propose a novel approach to maximize the DSP pro t while ensuring an adequate budget spending for its advertisers clients. We take into account that the DSP may bid in di erent ad exchanges who may use di erent auction rules. Appropriately modeling the impression arrival, auction, and click/action processes our non-convex model gives as an output bidding and allocation vectors that can be used in real time by a DSP to bid in RTB environments. To solve our model we propose a dual formulation using Fenchel conjugates and derive a two-phase primal-dual procedure to solve our non-convex problem. We show that the solutions given by our solution procedure are optimal for several rst and second price auctions, results that up to our knowledge are novel in the literature. Experimental results show how our methodology is able to trade o DSP pro tability for be er budget spending for rst and second price auctions in synthetic data, and data based on a real DSP operation.
Due to space limitations we only review works very close to ours, and of those who we take ideas from. In terms of nding biding and allocation schemes di erent schemes have been suggested in the literature from the ad exchange point of view [1, 3, 6] , and from the DSP side [4, 9] . In terms of spending the advertisers budget adequately [8, 12] set smart pacing strategies. Strategies for bidding using Lagrangian schemes for DSPs have appeared [10, 13] and who use the Ipinyou dataset to validate their results [14] as us. Here we formulate a dual problem using the concept of Fenchel conjugates [2, p. 91], which we solve using standard subgradients methods. Our results are similar in spirit to the recent work [11] . e la er studies a non-convex multi-agent optimization problem and also uses Fenchel conjugates to construct a dual problem. Our work di ers from the la er as we are able to obtain stronger theoretical results in comparison to [11] using the structure of the online advertising problem studied here (which makes our proofs unique).
e rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the notation and problem statement and we set up the model. Section 3 show our proposed optimization problem. In Section 4 we propose a dual for our problem of interest, showing several properties of it and proposing a two-phase primal-dual scheme. In Section 5 we show important optimality results and propose two-phase primal-dual scheme to solve our problem of interest. Experimental results using the Ipinyou data [14] are presented in Section 6, and we mention some future work directions. Section 7 is the appendix which has the proofs to all propositions and theorems shown in this work.
MODEL FOUNDATIONS
Let us begin by describing the basic structure and ow of events in the model. Let K denote the set of all campaigns associated with advertisers managed by the DSP. e DSP interacts with several ad exchanges, and recall that each auction held by one of these ad exchanges represents an opportunity to show an ad to a particular impression (i.e., a user). Although there may be billions of possible impression opportunities each day, we assume that the DSP uses a procedure for mapping each impression opportunity to an impression type. Let I denote the set of all such impression types. Whenever an opportunity for an impression of type i ∈ I arrives to one of the ad exchanges, the DSP has to make two real-time strategic decisions related to the corresponding auction: (i) how to select a campaign k ∈ K to bid on behalf of in the auction, and (ii) how to set the corresponding bid price b ik . If the DSP wins the auction on behalf of campaign k, then the DSP pays the corresponding market price (which depends on the auction type) to the ad exchange, and an ad from campaign k is displayed to the user. e advertiser corresponding to campaign k is charged only if the user clicks on the ad.
Key Parameters for Impression Types and Campaigns. Our model presumes that the DSP has knowledge (or estimates) of the following parameters:
• s i is the expected number of impressions of type i that will arrive during the planning horizon.
• m k is the (advertiser selected) budget for campaign k during the planning horizon.
• I k denotes the set of impression types that campaign k targets.
(Note that each advertiser can create multiple campaigns to achieve di erent targeting goals.) • q k > 0 is the CPC (cost per click) price for campaign k, i.e., the amount charged to the associated advertiser each time a user clicks on an advertisement from campaign k. Auction Modeling. We take a exible approach to auction modeling. In particular, we simply presume that, for each impression type i ∈ I, the DSP has constructed the following two bid landscape [5] functions (which include rst and second price auctions):
• ρ i (b) -the probability of winning an auction for an impression of type i ∈ I given that the DSP submi ed a bid of b.
• β i (b) -the expected amount the DSP pays the ad exchange, conditional on the DSP winning the auction with a submi ed bid of b. We will assume ρ i (b) and β i (b) to be non-decreasing functions, and
Click Events. Whenever an ad of campaign k ∈ K is shown to an impression of type i ∈ I (a er the DSP wins the corresponding auction), we presume that a click event happens with probability θ ik . In other words, θ ik is the expected click-through-rate. In addition, given an impression type i ∈ I and a campaign k ∈ K, let r ik denote the corresponding expected revenue earned by the DSP, which is the same as the expected cost per impression (eCPI) to the advertiser. Namely, it holds that r ik := q k θ ik where q k is the CPC price de ned earlier.
Decision Variables and Additional Notation. When the DSP has the opportunity to participate in an auction for an impression of type i ∈ I it needs to decide which campaign k ∈ K to bid on behalf of and the bid value to submit. Let E ⊆ I ×K denote the edges of an undirected bipartite graph between I and K, whereby there is an edge e = (i, k) ∈ E whenever campaign k targets impression type
the set of campaigns that target impression type i. For each edge (i, k) ∈ E, we de ne two decision variables: (i) x ik the probability that the DSP selects campaign k, and (ii) b ik the bid value to submit to the auction. Interpreted di erently, x ik represents a proportional allocation, i.e., the fraction of auctions for impression type i that are allocated to campaign k on average. ( e fraction of impression type i auctions for which the DSP decides to not bid is 1
Note that b ik represents the bid price that the DSP submits to an auction for impression type i conditional on the fact that the DSP has selected campaign k for the auction. Let x, b ∈ R | E | denote vectors of these quantities, which will represent decision variables in our model. Let us also de ne some additional notation used herein. For a given set S and a function f (·) : S → R, let arg max x ∈S f (x) denote the (possibly empty) set of maximizers of the function f (·) over the set S. If f (·) : R n → R is a convex function then, for a given x ∈ R n , ∂ f (x) denotes the set of subgradients of f (·) at x, i.e., the set of vectors such that f ( ) ≥ f (x) + T ( − x) for all ∈ R n . Finally, let [·] + be the function that returns the maximum between the input and 0, and denote a derivative in the right context.
OPTIMIZATION FORMULATION
Let us begin by recalling the model developed in [6] (proposed only for second price auctions there), which aims to maximize the pro t of the DSP under budget constraints:
e rst set of constraints above specify that the expected budget spent by each campaign should be less than the total available budget.
e second set of constraints bounds the range of the bid prices, and the third and fourth set of constraints ensure that x represents a valid probability vector when restricted to each impression type. e objective function is the expected DSP pro t, which we aim to maximize. Indeed, note that for each pair (i, k) ∈ E the quantity r ik − β i (b ik ) is the expected pro t earned by the DSP whenever an ad of campaign k is show to an impression of type i, and s i x ik ρ i (b ik ) is the expected number of impression of type i that we will acquire on behalf of campaign k.
erefore,
is the expected pro t due to bidding for impressions of type i on behalf of campaign k, and summing these quantities over all pairs (i, k) ∈ E yields the total expected pro t for the DSP, which we call π (x, b).
Notice that the previous formulation does not ensure or even encourage an adequate budget spending for the campaigns, it only ensures that each campaign does not spend in expectation more than its total budget. In reality, advertisers are not satis ed by merely ensuring that their spending on each campaign is below the speci ed budget level. Rather, most advertisers view the budget value m k as a "target" and may have complex preferences regarding their spending behaviors. For example, an advertiser may be very dissatis ed with underspending behavior and may in fact prefer slightly overspending above the budget value m k instead of severely underspending well below m k .
In order to greatly enhance the exibility of our model as well as its ability to capture complicated budget spending preferences, we replace the budget constraints in (1) with a more general utility function model as follows. First, note that the expected total spending of campaign k ∈ K, as a function of the decision variables, is given by
be a concave utility function describing the budget spending preferences of campaign k, whereby u k ( k ) is the "utility" of campaign k when its expected spending level is k . Furthermore, de ne the vector of expected spending levels (x, b) ∈ R |K | whose k th coordinate is k (x, b), and let u(·) : R |K | → R be the overall budget spending utility function whereby u ( (x, b) 
Finally, as an extra way to simplify notation let's de ne the feasible set of allocation and bidding variables:
We are now ready to state our proposed optimization model:
Note that problem (2) is non-convex, and in Section 4 we propose a computationally e cient procedure based on convex duality. We nish this section by showing three examples of utility functions that illustrate the improved generality and exibility of model (2) . Examples of Utility Functions (1) Formulation (1) may be recovered as a special case of the more general problem (2) by le ing u k (·) be the (extended real valued) concave function such that u k ( k ) equals −∞ if k is strictly greater than m k , and 0 otherwise. (2) If we want to maximize the DSP pro t but also try to enforce an appropriate target spending for a campaign k ∈ K, we can take u k (·) to be the concave function such that u k ( k ) equals −∞ if k is strictly greater than m k , and −
otherwise. Here τ k ≥ 0 is a user de ned penalization constant. (3) If we want to maximize the DSP pro t while requiring both a minimum and maximum expected spending for campaign k ∈ K, we can take u k (·) to be the concave function such that u k ( k ) equals −∞ if k is strictly greater than m k or strictly less than α k m k , and 0 otherwise. Here, the parameter α k ∈ [0, 1] is user de ned and represents the minimum percentage of expected budget spending. Note that the model (2) allows for each campaign to have its own distinct utility function u k (·), and therefore the three examples above may be combined together across the di erent campaigns, for example. Finally, note also that the separable structure of the utility function u(·), whereby u(·) = k ∈K u k (·), is actually not needed for all of the results that we develop herein. Indeed, the only crucial assumption about u(·) is that u(·) is a concave function. However, the separable structure is quite natural and all of our examples do have this separable structure as well, so for ease of presentation we present the model in this way.
DUAL OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM AND SCHEME
We begin this section with a high-level description of our approach for solving (2) . Our algorithmic approach is based on a two phase procedure. In the rst phase, we construct a suitable dual of (2), which turns out to be a convex optimization problem that can be e ciently solved with most subgradient based algorithms. A solution of the dual problem naturally suggests a way to set the bid prices b. In the second phase, we set the bid prices using the previously computed dual solution then we solve a convex optimization problem that results when b is xed in order to recover allocation probabilities x. A very mild assumption we make for the rest of the paper is that F * > −∞, otherwise there would be no optimization problem to optimize.
As we mentioned before we have assumed that our utility function u(·)is concave, therefore −u(·) is a convex function and we can de ne p(·) : R | K | → R its convex conjugate as p(λ)
For a given λ ∈ R | K | we will de ne the dual function as:
And the dual problem as:
en, the following inequalities hold for our primal and dual formulations (they follow from the max-min inequality [2, p. 238]):
the expected pro t the DSP receives from showing an ad of campaign k to an impression of type i which has an expected revenue of $z when submi ing a bid of value $b. en, given a xed λ ∈ R | K | the dual function Q(λ) can re-de ned as:
. Given a dual variable λ, an optimal solution (x(λ), b(λ)) for the dual function Q(λ) can be found using Algorithm 1.
, and
eorem 1 shows that the dual problem can be solved in a parallel fashion, and furthermore nding b(λ) can be a simple operation. For example, in the case of a second price auction it is known that [r ik (1 − 
, and some examples for rst price auctions have nice close forms as shown in the next section. Being able to solve Q(λ) e ciently is of great importance as it is a core component to nd a subgradient of Q(λ) as the following theorem shows: P 4.2. Given λ ∈ R |K | the output of Algorithm 2 is a vector ∈ ∂Q(λ).
Algorithm 2 Computing a subgradient of Q(λ)
Input: λ ∈ R |K | 1. Obtain (x(λ), b(λ)) ∈ arg max Q(λ) using Algorithm 1.
Output: (λ) ∈ ∂Q(λ) .
Notice that with STEP 1. in Algorithm 1 we can recover bidding prices b(λ) from dual variables λ ∈ R |K | .
e nal eorem of this section shows that for xed bidding prices b is easy to obtain allocation probabilities x by solving problem (2). Proposition 4.3 tell us that we could use a sub-gradient method to nd to nd an allocation vector x given a xed b. Be er than the previous, depending on the utility function used (2) can have a nice structure, for example for the utility function examples shown in the previous section, examples 1. and 3. transform problem (2) in a linear program and example 2. in a quadratic problem. Problems that could be solved directly using solvers like Gurobi [7] . We nish this section by presenting Algorithm 3 which formalize our approach to solve problem (2).
Algorithm 3 Two Phase primal-dual Scheme
Phase 1: Solve the Dual problem.
Solve min λ Q(λ) to near global optimality using a subgradient method obtaining dual variablesλ. Phase 2: Primal Recovery
2. Using bid prices b(λ) solve (2) obtaining allocation probabilitiesx. Output: Feasible primal solution (x,b).
ZERO DUALITY GAP RESULTS
Algorithm 3 can always be used as long as the parameters and functions of problem (2) are well de ned. Here we we will go further and show that our dual formulation and dual scheme are the right methods to solve (2) . In particular, we have strong duality results which to the best of our knowledge are novel and have important applications to rst and second price auctions by showing optimal bidding prices to be used in an RTB environment. ese will be derived from the following theorem: T 5.1. If for all i ∈ I we have that ρ i (·) and β i (·) are di erentiable and:
is strictly increasing for all b ∈ [0,b i ].
for all i ∈ I, then for any λ * ∈ arg max
Notice that eorem 5.1 ensures that no duality gap exists, but furthermore for an optimal dual variable λ * it gives a form of the variables (x * , b * ) such that F (x * , b * ) = Q(λ * ). Also, notice that the second condition of the theorem is a form of diminishing returns. Also, for an optimal dual variable λ * optimal bidding prices are 
for all (i, k) ∈ E. (4) Any combination of the above, or cases in which each impression type satis es the conditions of eorem 5.1. We nish this section by making three important comments. First, to obtain the form of the optimal bidding prices is only needed to solve arg max b ∈[0,b i ] h i (r ik (1−λ * k ), b). In many cases, like second price auction, this will have a close form, but for many others the DSP can have tables with approximate solutions that can be used instead of solving the problem in real time. Second, many adexchanges use what are called hard reserve prices that consider a bid valid only if it is higher than the reserve price. is poses a problem for eorem 5.1 as the condition of ρ(·) being strictly non-decreasing would not be true. If the impression types had xed hard reserve prices this is not a major issue as we can change the model to bid between the reserve price andb i (if the reserve price were higher thanb i wouldn't bid for that impression type). In the case that hard reserve prices change dynamically, heuristics could be used, e.g. considering bidding in real time only only for those campaigns with bid values higher than the reserve price, pu ing levels of reserve price as a eld in the impression types, and others which we don't explore here. ird, it can be proven that eorem 5.1 guarantees that Algorithm 3 would converge to an optimal solution for (2) as we get be er λ solutions of the dual problem. For space reasons we don't extend on this topic here.
COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS
Here we present computational results using the Ipinyou DSP data [14] to which we applied our two-phase solution procedure comparing its performance w.r.t. a greedy heuristic. e way we suggest and apply in our experiments an allocation and bidding variables (x, b) in a practical RTB environment is shown in Policy 4 and the heuristic to which we compare our method is shown in Policy 5.
e Greedy Heuristic is optimal for the case of in nite budgets
Policy 4 Online Policy Implied by (x,b)
Input: Allocation and bidding variables (x,b) and a new impression arrival of type i ∈ I. 1. Sample a campaignk ∈ K i according to the distribution implied by the values x ik for k ∈ K i or break with probability 
Policy 5 Greedy Policy
Input: New impression arrival i ∈ I.
1. Bid for a campaign k ∈ K i with remaining budget bigger than q k with the highest r ik value.
and second price auctions (is easy to extend it to arbitrary auction types). As an important remark our method should be used in a real DSP operation inside a Model Predictive Control Scheme, which calls Algorithm 3 as budgets get used and di erent model inputs gets updated as time progresses. e public available Ipinyou data [14] contains information about real bidding made by the chinese DSP Ipinyou in 2013. It contains di erent features including the bidding prices of the impressions for which Ipinyou bid for, and the price paid by Ipinyou to the adexchange in case an impression was won and if a click or conversion occurred (we did not use conversion data). Ipinyou assumes that ad-exchanges use second price auctions. e data is already divided in train and test sets and it has been used to test bidding strategies for DSPs [10, 13] but we haven't found a paper that use it for both bidding and allocation strategies, reason why we compare to the Greedy Heuristic 5. Ipinyou data is divided in three di erent time periods in 2013, of those we decided to use the third as in the rst there is no information about the campaigns Ipinyou bid for, and in the second Ipinyou assumed that all impression types could serve all campaigns which make the impression-campaign graph noninteresting. e third season contains 3.15M of and 1.5M logs of impressions won by Ipinyou in the train and test set resp. in behlaf of four advertisers, which have 2716 and 1155 clicks associated to them. Here we use the di erent advertisers as our campaigns.
To create "impression types" we divided the impressions by the visibility feature which has a strong correlation with CTR, and then by the regions, homepage url, and "width x height" of the ad to be shown (features that appear in all impression logs).
e last three features have a high dimensionality, for example homepage url have 54,108 unique urls. For that reason we created mutually exclusive sets of the form all urls that were targeted only by advertiser 1, all that were targeted only by advertisers 1 and 3, etc. With this technique we partition all impressions for which Ipinyou bid for in 160 clusters of impressions which we used to create our nal partition of 23 impression types. Of those 19 corresponds to the clusters with a minimum of 30,000 impressions won in the train set and the 4 le are the union of all clusters having di erent visibility a ribute (we grouped together the second, third, fourth and h view as if they were the same visibility type). Our nal graph is composed of 4 campaigns, 23 impression types, it has 43 edges, and the di erent CTR were taken as the empirical rates for each combination of (impression type, advertiser). Using only the impressions won in the train set for each impression type i we ed a beta distribution using the python Scipy package (imposing the location parameter to be equal to zero) to obtain parameters to estimate the bid landscape functions (the ρ i (·) function is just a function call, but the β i (·) function was estimated using Monte-Carlo). Finally, we count the times each impression type appears in the test set to create the s i values, and the budgets correspond to the total amount of money that Ipinyou paid for the impressions assigned to each advertiser in the test set. To simulate a real time environment we used the empirical train CTR to train our models and the greedy heuristic (we took the average CTR per impression for the pairs of (impression type,advertiser) that appear less than 5000). To test our model we use the impressions won by Ipinyou in the actual order saving their impression type. en, one by one we read each impression log and we assume that the impression was won if the proposed bid for it is higher than the amount Ipinyou paid for it. A click for the proposed advertiser occurs with probability equal to the empirical CTR from the test data for the pair (impression type, advertiser). We tried the utility functions 1. and 2. from Section 3, using τ k = 1/m k for all k ∈ K for second one.
Results. Our results are shown in Figure 1 . Here we de ne budget utilization (b.u.) as the percentage of the total budget that was used at the end of one simulation, and u.f. stands for utility function. We performed two experiments. e rst was to see the sensitive of our model w.r.t. to the budget. We tried 1/32, 1/8, 1/4, 1/2 and 1/0 of the budgets Ipinyou used for each advertiser in the test data and we run 100 simulations for each se ing obtaining average pro t and b.u. Our results are all relative to the average pro t and b.u. obtained by using the greedy heuristic. What makes one simulation di erent from the other is that the CTR is a random variable. In the second experiment we multiply the penalization parameters tau k = 1/m k that appear in the u.f. 2 by 0.1, then by 0.3, and so on until 2.1 running 100 simulations in each case obtaining the average pro t and b.u. All our results are relative to the average pro t and b.u. of the u.f. 1. and we also include the average results from the greedy heuristic for comparison. Our results show that our methodology works very well for cases in which the budget is tight, but when is not the case the greedy heuristic is a good alternative. From our second experiment we can see that a be er b.u. utilization can be obtained at the cost of having a worst pro t (it can even be negative). Figure 1 : Two-phase policy vs. greedy policy Let us conclude this section by mentioning a few directions for future research. It would be very valuable to perform experiments in which impressions are auctioned in both rst and second price auctions and in which the cardinality of the impression types and campaigns are higher. Also, several of the quantities we assume as known in this work are hard to estimate in practice. We will study robust approaches to our model.
PROOFS OF THE PROPOSITIONS AND THEOREM 5.1
In this appendix we will make use of the following de nitions which for space we skip in the main text (we use them in the proofs of Proposition 4.2 and eorem 5.1):
De nition 7.1.
• e set of feasible bidding and allocation variables for a given impression type is:
e expected amount campaigns spend in impressions of type i is i (x, b) ∈ R |K | which is a vector whose k ∈ K coordinate takes the value of r ik s i x ik ρ i (b ik ) if (i, k) ∈ K and 0 o.w. en,
• e contribution of the di erent impression types in the dual function is separable, and therefore given a xed dual variable λ ∈ R |K | we de ne for each i ∈ I:
• Let's de ne the pro t from impressions of type i in the objective from impression of type i in (1) as
Notice that for any i ∈ I both i (x, b) and π i (x, b) depend only in (x i , b i ) ∈ S i , but we decide to use this notation to not carry the " i ∈I " everywhere.
Proof of Proposition 4.1

P
. For xed λ we have that p(λ) is a constant, then we need to focus only on the maximization part of Q(λ). For any xed x ≥ 0 we have:
Take (i, k) ∈ E arbitrary and assume
is an optimal bidding price for the pair (i, k) independent of the value of x ik which proves STEP 1. of Algorithm 1. Fixing b = b(λ), we can use that for each i ∈ I we have k ∈I k x ik ≤ 1 and x ik ≥ 0 for all (i, k) ∈ E are the only constraints for x (w.r.t. to impression type i), therefore is optimal for each impression type i ∈ I to bid only for a campaign that maximizes the pro t we can get from it. If for an impression type i there is no campaign k ∈ K i which gives us a positive pro t, then is optimal to not bid for that impression type. at's exactly what STEP 2. of Algorithm 1 concluding the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.2
P
. Here we assume λ ∈ R | K | x. Notice that using the de nitions from De nition 7.1 we have Q(λ) = i ∈I ψ i (λ) + p(λ). We are going that to show that for any (x(λ), b(λ)) ∈ arg max Q(λ) and any λ ∈ R | K | we have
e previous is enough to nish this proof as
Let λ ∈ R | K | be any dual variable di erent from λ (if not the following set of equations are trivial), and let i ∈ I arbitrary, then:
7.3 Proof of Proposition 4.3 P . Assume b xed. e domain of F (b) is a set of linear constraints, then we only need to proof that the objective function is concave. Clearly the summation part of the objective function is linear and therefore concave, then is only le to show that the utility function part is concave. e la er is true as (·, b) is an a ne function in term of the allocation probabilities, therefore u( (·, b) ) is the composition of a concave and a ne function and therefore concave.
Proof of eorem 5.1
is proof uses the terminology de ned in De nition 7.1 and we can assume ρ i (·) and β i (·) to be continuous functions for all parts in this proof as it is a weaker condition than being di erentiable which is part of the hypothesis of eorem 5.1. We will start by showing that if we assume ρ i (·) and β i (·) to be continuous for all i ∈ I, then we can obtain the explicit form of the sub-di erential ∂Q(λ) for any xed λ ∈ R | K | (Lemma 7.2). Result that we combine with Lemma 7.3 to prove Lemma 7.4. e later results will help us prove that if there exists an optimal dual variable λ * that satis es a condition we call "Unique Solution" (De nition 7.5), then there is no duality gap (Lemma 7.6). Finally, we will prove eorem 5.1 by showing that when the hypothesis of the theorem holds, then the "Unique Solution" condition hold for any feasible lambda λ (i.e., p(λ) < ∞), and therefore for any optimal dual variable.
Let's rst de ne S * i as the set of optimal solutions for ψ i (·) given λ ∈ R K for some i ∈ I, i.e. S * i (λ) := arg max
(Equivalent to Lemma 3.3 in [11] ) e sub-di erential of the dual function is
, and ϕ(·, ·) is differentiable w.r.t. to its rst argument, ϕ(·, ·) is a continuous function w.r.t. both of its arguments, and ∂ϕ/∂λ is a continuous function w.r.t. to its second argument for all λ. en, Danskin's eorem
If there exists λ * optimal dual variable, such that (x * , b * ) ∈ ∂p(λ * ), for some (x * , b * ) ∈ S * (λ * ), then Q(λ * ) = F (x * , b * ).
P
. Using that Q(λ * ) = Q * , the optimality of (x * , b * ) and the de nition of F (x, b) we have:
Let's de ne the convex function ζ (λ) := p(λ) − (x * , b * ) T λ, then ( − (x * , b * )) ∈ ∂ζ (λ * ) for any ∈ ∂p(λ * ). By hypothesis it exists ∈ ∂p(λ * ), such that − i ∈I i (x * i , b * i ) = 0 then, using the subgradient inequality:
Which shows that λ * is a minimizer of ζ (·) concluding the proof. L 7.4. If there exists λ * optimal dual solution, such that the sets V i := { i (x * , b * )|(x * i , b * i ) ∈ S * i (λ * )} are convex for all i ∈ I, then it exists (x * , b * ) ∈ arg max Q(λ * ), such that F (x * , b * ) = Q(λ * ).
. If V i is convex by de nition we have V i = con (V i ) for all i ∈ I which would imply ∂ i ∈I ψ i (λ) = i ∈I V i . Lemma 7.2 tells us −∂ i ∈I ψ i (λ) + ∂p(λ * ) = ∂Q(λ * ), and by the optimality of λ * we have that 0 ∈ ∂Q(λ * ). Using the convexity of the V i , there exists (x * i , b * i ) ∈ S * i (λ * ) for all i ∈ I and ∈ ∂p(λ * ), such that if we call , then if λ * is an optimal dual solution that satis es the Unique Solution condition, then there exists (x * , b * ) ∈ arg max Q(λ * ) such that Q(λ * ) = F (x * , b * ). P T 7.6. Let λ * be an optimal dual solution that satis es the Unique Solution condition. Our goal here will be to show that sets V i from Corollary 7.4 w.r.t. to λ * are convex for all i ∈ I which would conclude this proof. Let I = I ∩ I with I the set of impression types such that ψ i (λ * ) > 0 for all i ∈ I , and i ∈ I if ψ i (λ * ) = 0. Notice that we can assume r ik > 0 for all (i, k) ∈ E as if it weren't case for some (i, k) ∈ E it would be optimal to make x ik = 0 in our primal problem (1) and the edge could have been removed from the problem de nition. en, using the la er, the continuity of functions ρ i (·) and β i (·) and that ρ i h i (r ik (1 − λ), b) for all k ∈ K i . For this case we have:
en, the set V i from Lemma 7.4 is a convex set for any i ∈ I as it would be equal to the convex hull over a nite amount of points.
is is easy to see as the k t h coordinate of any of its vectors is equal to 0 if λ * 
